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It is trite to say that e-commerce has exploded over
the last several years. Canadian individuals and businesses are entering into thousands and thousands of contracts online all the time. Yet, oddly enough, there is
surprisingly little legal certainty or consistency regarding
an essential legal question: what approach to online contract formation will create a binding legal contract? Such
legal uncertainty is unfortunate, since buyers need to
know when to ‘‘beware’’, merchants need to be able to
manage risk, and courts need to have clear guidelines in
order to be able to render informed, coherent decisions.
The issue of online contract formation was recently
treated in the Quebec court decision Aspencerl.com v.
Paysystems Corporation 1 (Paysystems). The legal argument in the decision differs significantly from existing
Canadian and Quebec jurisprudence on the subject of
online contract formation. Accordingly, this case comment is intended to analyse and critique the Paysystems
decision, to discuss and evaluate current approaches to
online contract formation more generally, and to provide advice regarding how to mitigate the risk of a
finding of non-enforceability.

The Court had to determine whether it had jurisdiction to hear the dispute, given the presence of the
arbitration clause. In order to decide the matter, the
Court first had to decide whether the online unilateral
amendment was enforceable.
Pursuant to a legal analysis discussed below, the
Court held that Aspencerl.com Inc.’s mere use of the
Paysystems Corp. Web site following the posting of the
amendment and the above notice was insufficient to
establish binding consent to the posted amendments.
Therefore, the arbitration clause that was contained in
the said amendments was unenforceable.

Summary

Q

uebec jurisprudence on the subject of online contract formation is rare and the conclusions of such
cases are broadly divergent. Under the circumstances, it
is difficult to obtain legal certainty as regards the application of Article 1385 of the Civil Code of Quebec to
online contract formation. Pursuant to the analysis
below, I am of the opinion that the Court’s reasoning in
the Paysystems decision contains a number of significant
errors of law that suggest that the case is unlikely to be
followed or, if followed, that its reasoning will be subject
to significant critique. The fact that the decision was
rendered by the Cour du Québec will also limit its significance as a precedent.
The key to ensuring a binding online contract is to
establish a direct correspondence between the offer and
what is accepted, as well as a manifestation of the will of
a person to accept an offer to contract. Such manifestation may be express or tacit.
Where an individual is presented with contractual
terms in an electronic or paper environment and the
individual writes or states or clicks ‘‘I agree’’, the individual is expressly manifesting his or her consent to the

The Paysystems Decision

O

n January 31, 2005, the Cour du Québec rendered
a decision in Paysystems that treated the issue of
the enforceability of an amendment to a paper-based
contract. The case involved a dispute in relation to a
hosting and services agreement between Paysystems Corporation and Aspencerl.com Inc. The two parties entered
into the agreement in 2002. The original agreement did
not contain an arbitration clause. On October 23, 2003,
Paysystems Corporation unilaterally amended the original contract and added an exclusive arbitration clause,
made available via hyperlink and subject to the following online notice on the opening screen of the
Paysystems Web site:
Your continued use of My Paysystems Services is subject to
the current version of the My Paysystems Contract.

†© Charles Morgan, a partner in the Technology Law Group of McCarthy Tétrault LLP in Montréal. The author wishes to acknowledge the research
assistance of Valérie Lemieux, associate in the Technology Law group of McCarthy Tétrault LLP in Montréal. The opinions expressed in this case comment, as
well as any errors that may appear herein, are the author’s alone.
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terms of the offer. Moreover, based on the jurisprudence
cited below, tacit manifestation of consent may be established where the offeree performs a ‘‘positive gesture’’
that unequivocally demonstrates an intention to accept
the offer.
Finally, in my conclusions and recommendations at
the end of this case comment, I discuss various
approaches to online contract formation and the most
effective means of mitigating the risk of a court finding
that the approach adopted will be held to be unenforceable.

Legislative Framework
Technological Neutrality
The Quebec Act to establish a legal framework for
information technology 2 (the ‘‘Quebec Technology Act’’)
enshrines the principle of technological neutrality at section 5, which states:
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The legal value of a document, particularly its capacity to
produce legal effects and its admissibility as evidence, is
neither increased nor diminished solely because of the
medium or technology chosen.

A similar principle is contained in each of the Uniform Electronic Commerce Act-inspired, common-law
provincial e-commerce legislation. For example, the
Ontario Act provides that information or a document to
which the Act applies is not invalid or unenforceable by
reason only of being in electronic form. 3
In light of this principle, courts should avoid placing
any greater or lesser burden on parties who wish to
contract in an electronic medium than they would on
parties who contract orally or on paper.
Offer and Acceptance
Unlike the majority of Uniform Electronic Commerce Act-inspired e-commerce laws (applicable in the
common-law provinces), the Quebec Technology Act
does not contain provisions that specifically address contract formation by electronic means, nor does it address
‘‘electronic agents’’. Instead, the Quebec Technology Act
implicitly relies on the inherent technological neutrality
of the provisions of the Civil Code of Quebec (‘‘CCQ’’)
related to offer and acceptance.
According to Article 1385 of the CCQ:
A contract is formed by the sole exchange of consents
between persons having capacity to contract, unless, in addition, the law requires a particular form to be respected as a
necessary condition of its formation, or unless the parties
require the contract to take the form of a solemn agreement. 4 It is also of the essence of a contract that it have a
cause and an object.

According to Article 1386 of the CCQ:
The exchange of consents is accomplished by the express or
tacit manifestation of the will of a person to accept an offer
to contract made to him by another person.

According to Article 1393 of the CCQ:

Acceptance which does not correspond substantially to the
offer or which is received by the offeror after the offer has
lapsed does not constitute acceptance. It may, however, constitute a new offer.

Article 1394 of the CCQ states:
Silence does not imply acceptance of an offer, subject only
to the will of the parties, the law or special circumstances,
such as usage or a prior business relationship.

Finally, according to Article 1387 of the CCQ:
A contract is formed when and where acceptance is received
by the offeror, regardless of the method of communication
used, and even though the parties have agreed to reserve
agreement as to secondary terms.

The language of these provisions is technologically
neutral. The key to ensuring a binding online contract is
to establish a direct correspondence between the offer
and what is accepted, as well as a manifestation of the
will of a person to accept an offer to contract. Such
manifestation may be express or tacit.
Writing, Signature, and Other Formalities
On the whole, very few types of contracts are subject to formal requirements (such as writing, signature,
disclosure, or delivery requirements) beyond valid offer
and acceptance in order to be enforceable. For example,
the Quebec Consumer Protection Act (‘‘CPA’’) refers to
very specific types of contracts that must be evidenced in
writing at section 23 (including contracts for credit). 5
The CPA sets forth signature requirements at section 27. 6
Neither of these provisions (nor, to my knowledge, any
other statutory formalism) applies to the contract
described in the Paysystems decision. 7

Jurisprudence
Quebec Online Contracting Decisions

Paysystems
In Paysystems, the Cour du Québec held that mere
use of a Web site on which a notice was posted would
not imply tacit consent to amended contractual terms
(also posted on the Web site), particularly where there
was uncontested testimonial evidence to the effect that
the Web site user had not actually taken notice of the
amendments. 8
Although it is possible that the Court’s conclusion is
essentially correct, the Court’s reasoning contains a
number of errors of law that would suggest that the case
is unlikely to be followed without significant critique
and distinguishing.
First, the Court suggests that the procedure used by
an Internet-based merchant to establish binding acceptance of contractual terms may not involve mere tacit
acquiescence to such terms. 9 However, Article 1386 of
the CCQ states clearly that the exchange of consents is
accomplished by the express or tacit manifestation of the
will of a person to accept an offer to contract made to
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him by another person. In other words, it is legally erroneous to suggest categorically that tacit acceptance of an
Internet-based offer is unenforceable under Quebec law.
Instead, each case must be examined on its facts to determine whether or not there is sufficient evidence of tacit
acceptance, based on the actions of the offeree.
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Second, the Court, citing doctrine, 10 suggests that
something more than a mere ‘‘click’’ is required in order
to establish binding consent to an electronic contract. 11
The suggestion is oddly contradicted by the Court later
in the same decision when it cites with approval the
Rudder v. Microsoft decision (cited by the Court as an
example of a decision which is consistent with the rules
of the CCQ in relation to consent). 12 The Rudder decision stands for the proposition that a valid contract may
be formed using a ‘‘clickwrap’’ approach to contract formation (a finding that has been codified in most Canadian provincial e-commerce laws). In many instances a
mere ‘‘click’’ will be sufficient to establish consent (just as
marking a paper contract with an ‘‘X’’ or saying ‘‘I Agree’’
may form valid contracts).
Third, the Court cites with apparent approval doctrine that suggests that ‘‘computer contracts’’ are subject
to a signature requirement. 13 The Court then notes that
the amendments were not ‘‘signed’’ by the parties. 14 This
doctrinal and legal assertion is unfounded. As noted
above, only a very limited subset of contracts (such as
those referred to in section 27 of the CPA) are subject to
signature requirements to be enforceable.
The net result is that the Court holds that (i) tacit
acceptance of an electronic offer may never be binding;
(ii) something more than a ‘‘mere’’ click is likely required
to form a binding online contract; and (iii) a signature
may be necessary to establish binding consent to the
online contract. In my opinion, none of these assertions
are accurate.
Finally, the Court’s reasoning suffers from an error
of omission. Specifically, while the Court cites both the
Ontario Superior Court decision of Rudder and the
Alberta Queen’s Bench decision of North American Systemshops v. King, 15 it fails to cite the two decisions that
are arguably most relevant to the analysis: Kanitz v.
Rogers Cable Inc. and Canadian Real Estate Association
v. Sutton, both of which are discussed below.

its own Web site. The Court found that Sutton’s actions
likely violated the ‘‘terms of use’’ agreement posted on
the mls.ca Web site. The terms were subject to a webwrap approach to online contract formation rather than
a clickwrap approach (i.e., they were posted on the Web
site and made available via hyperlink, but a visitor to the
Web site was not required to click on an ‘‘I agree’’ icon
or otherwise expressly manifest consent to the terms).
The Court granted the injunction nevertheless, holding
that the Canadian Real Estate Association (CREA) had an
apparent right in the integrity of its Web site, that Sutton
had violated that right, and that Sutton had, apparently,
knowingly violated the CREA ‘‘terms of use’’ agreement.
While Sutton argued that it was not bound by the
CREA’s ‘‘terms of use’’ because it had not clicked on an
‘‘I Agree’’ button (or otherwise manifestly indicated its
consent), the Superior Court decided that the issue was
best left to be determined on final judgment. In granting
the injunction, the Court appeared to be influenced by
the fact that Sutton ‘‘knew what it was doing’’ and,
among other things, found evidence that Sutton knew
that the CREA terms of use applied to it (despite the fact
that there was no clickwrap) because Sutton had its own
‘‘terms of use’’ posted using a webwrap approach on its
own Web site.
It is not clear whether the Court in Paysystems consciously chose not to cite Sutton or whether it was
simply not made aware of the decision. What is clear,
however, is that the two decisions (Sutton and Paysystems) sit at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of the
guidance they provide to companies and individuals
who wish to carry on electronic commerce. Specifically,
whereas the Paysystems decision appears to suggest that
even a ‘‘clickwrap’’ approach to online contract formation may be insufficient to establish binding consent,
Sutton suggests that a mere ‘‘webwrap’’ approach to
online contract formation may in some instances be
binding. 17 This degree of divergence is unfortunate, as it
makes it very difficult for merchants and consumers to
know in advance what they must do in order to form a
binding online contract.
The analysis below presents an attempt to provide a
reasonable mean between these two extremes.

Quebec ‘‘Implicit Consent’’ Decisions

Sutton
Canadian Real Estate Association v. Sutton
(Quebec) Real Estate Services Inc. 16 is a rare, recent
example of a Quebec court considering electronic contract formation. In that decision, the Quebec Superior
Court considered the enforceability of a webwrap agreement in the context of a request for an interlocutory
injunction. The Court granted an interlocutory injunction against Sutton, ordering Sutton to cease
downloading listings from the <http://www.mls.ca>
Web site for the purpose of reposting the information on

The applicable legal analysis to contract formation
should be essentially technologically neutral so as to
ensure the functional equivalence and legal value of documents, regardless of the medium used, and the interchangeability of media and technologies, in accordance
with sections 2 and 5 of the Quebec Technology Act.
Below is a summary of some of the leading Quebec
jurisprudence regarding implicit or tacit consent as a
means of providing guidance regarding the circumstances under which implicit or tacit consent to contractual terms posted online may be inferred.
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Gestion Infopharm Inc.
In Gestion Infopharm Inc. v. B.C.E. Emergis Inc., 18
the parties were subject to a software license and services
agreement with a one-year term. The agreement contained a fees schedule in relation to programming services to be performed by Infopharm. The agreement was
tacitly renewed at the end of its initial term. Approximately two years after the commencement of the contract, Infopharm unilaterally sent a revised fees schedule
to Emergis that significantly increased the applicable service fees. Emergis responded by sending a termination
notice.
One of the principal issues at trial was whether the
new fees schedule had been accepted by Emergis. On
this point, Infopharm argued that by failing to react in
any way to the notice of the amended fees schedule
during a period of five months following receipt of
Infopharm’s notice thereof, Emergis had tacitly accepted
the revised contract terms. The Court, noting that
Infopharm continued to apply the terms of the original
fees schedule for four months following notice to
Emergis thereof, rejected Infopharm’s argument. It noted
that Emergis immediately sent the notice of resiliation
following receipt of Infopharm’s first invoice that applied
the new fees.
On the subject of tacit or implicit consent, the
Court held the following:
Emergis did not make any positive gesture that would
have permitted Infopharm to consider that the [revised
fees schedule] had been accepted. It is true that acquiescence may be tacit, but it must be unequivocal, which is to
say that the intention to acquiesce or to waive rights must
be demonstrated or clear. [translation]

The Emergis decision, in the passage cited above,
cites two Supreme Court of Canada decisions, The Mile
End Milling Company v. Peterborough Cereal Company 19 and Grace and Company v. C.E. Perras, 20 summarized below.

Mile End Milling Company
In Mile End, the dispute involved a contract for the
shipment of flour. One of the questions before the Court
was whether one of the parties had waived a contractual
right by means of acquiescence. The Supreme Court
held that one should never presume that another has
waived a right. While acquiescence may be tacit, it must
be unequivocal and demonstrated.
Grace and Company
In Grace and Company, following verbal negotiations regarding a supply agreement, one party sent a
letter to the other party setting out the said party’s understanding of the terms to which the parties had agreed,
requesting that the other party confirm. The recipient of
the letter did not respond. The question at trial was
whether, under the circumstances, such silence implied
acceptance of the terms. According to the Supreme
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Court, the silence of the party to whom a declaration
regarding the existence of a contract is made does not,
generally speaking, imply acceptance of an obligation. In
order to consent, it requires a positive gesture. The
former principle has been codified at Article 1394 of the
CCQ.

L. Bucci Estimation Inc.
More recently, in 141517 Canada Inc. v. L. Bucci
Estimation Inc., 21 the Cour du Québec summarized doctrine and jurisprudence (all Superior Court judgments)
on implicit or tacit consent, by citing the following principles:
●

●

●

Acceptance is tacit when it appears from the circumstances that the party wishes to take advantage
of (‘‘se prévaloir’’) the offer. [translation]
Implicit consent is demonstrated by the facts and
must not leave any doubt regarding the will and
the person . . . [translation]
Although it may be tacit and result from the acts
and gestures of a party, tacit consent to a contract is
not presumed. In the case of a doubt, the doubt
must be interpreted against the formation of a contract. [translation]

Conclusions
Where an individual is presented with contractual
terms in an electronic or paper environment and the
individual writes or states or clicks ‘‘I agree’’, the individual is expressly manifesting his or her consent to the
terms of the offer. Moreover, based on the above-cited
jurisprudence, tacit manifestation of consent may be
established where the offeree performs a ‘‘positive gesture’’ that ‘‘unequivocally’’ demonstrates an intention to
accept the offer.
Canadian Common Law Online Contracting Decisions

Rudder
In Rudder v. Microsoft Corp., [1999] O.J. No. 3778
(Ont. Sup. Ct) (‘‘ Rudder ’’) an Ontario court, in a case of
first impression in Canada, held that an online membership agreement became enforceable against a subscriber
once the subscriber clicked an ‘‘I Agree’’ button. The
plaintiffs argued that the member agreement was not
binding on them because only a portion of the agreement was presented on the screen at one time and
because the term which Microsoft sought to enforce
against them, an exclusive forum selection clause, was
not seen by the plaintiffs before they clicked on the ‘‘I
Agree’’ button. The plaintiffs contended that the parts of
the agreement which had to be viewed by scrolling
throughout the agreement were essentially ‘‘fine print’’
and not enforceable against them. The Rudder Court
held the ‘‘clickwrap’’ agreement to be enforceable. It also
held that the forum selection clause to be binding on the
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plaintiffs, even though they had not read that part of the
agreement.
The Rudder Court found that although the visitors
to the site claimed not to have read the entire terms and
conditions, they should be deemed to have done so. One
of the reasons for the decision was the fact that the terms
and conditions were available for scrolling on the same
Web page as the ‘‘I Agree’’ button. The terms and conditions were held not be ‘‘fine print’’ for which consumers
might not be held accountable. Pursuant to the Court’s
reasoning, it would appear that it is not necessary to
demonstrate that visitors actually read the entire terms
and conditions in order for them to be enforceable, but
merely that the visitor had an opportunity to do so and
had accepted, by means of a positive gesture, their
binding nature.

Kanitz
Kanitz v. Rogers Cable Inc. 22 (‘‘ Kanitz ’’), provides
guidance as to the enforceability of unilateral contract
amendments that are posted online. In the decision, the
defendant moved to stay a proposed class action suit
against it on the ground that the agreement between the
plaintiffs and the defendant provided for arbitration of
all claims (thereby barring court action). The arbitration
clause in the agreement, however, had not been
included in the original hard copy version of the agreement sent to all users of the ‘‘Rogers@Home’’ service.
Rather, Rogers Cable inserted the arbitration clause in
an amended version of the agreement posted online at
Rogers’s Web site. The Court concluded that the clause
was enforceable, and hence, the action was stayed.
Various factors led the Court to conclude that the
amended terms of the agreement, posted online, were
enforceable. First, Rogers’s original agreement provided
for the possibility of unilateral amendment as follows:
Amendment. We may change, modify, add or remove portions of this Agreement at any time. We will notify you of
any changes to this Agreement by posting notice of such
changes on the Rogers@Home web site, or sending notice
via email or postal mail. Your continued use of the Service
following notice of such change means that you agree to
and accept the Agreement as amended. If you do not agree
to any modification of this Agreement, you must immediately stop using Rogers@Home and notify us that you are
terminating this Agreement.

Second, this amendment clause indicated that
Rogers would provide notice of any future amendments
and indicated the manner in which notice would be
given. Third, it explicitly indicated that consent to the
amendment could be established implicitly (i.e., based
on continued use of the service following notice of the
amendment). Fourth, the online version of the amended
agreement was available via hyperlink beside which the
following notice was posted:
End user Agreement. The End user Agreement (EUA) is
your contract with us. In most cases, the EUA was signed
during the installation of the Rogers@Home service. It outlines the rights and responsibilities of both Rogers@Home

113
and users of the service. Among other things, it tells the
customers what services Rogers@Home provides as well as
how these services can and cannot be used. To provide you
with the best Internet services possible, we update the EUA
on a periodic basis. Please keep checking back to obtain the
latest End user Agreement. The EUA was last updated
on: January 12th 2001. [The bold appeared in the original.]

Fifth, the fact that the user agreement had been
amended was noted on the main page of the Customer
Support site in the ‘‘News and Highlights’’ section.
In summary, according to the Court:
The user agreement expressly allows the defendant to
amend the user agreement and to give notice of that fact
through its web site. Each of the representative plaintiffs
who was originally a customer of the defendant actually
signed the user agreement which contained this amending
provision. Each of the representative plaintiffs who was originally a Shaw customer also signed a user agreement which
contained an amending provision. The Shaw customers
were given reasonable notice, when they became customers
of the defendant pursuant to the swap, of the terms of
service and other matters relating to the provision of the
service by the defendant. It would not be unreasonable
to expect that those customers would take the time
to visit the appropriate sections of the defendant’s
web site to familiarize themselves with the defendant’s terms of service if they were interested in
knowing what those terms of service were and
whether they differed in any material respect from
those of Shaw. In my view, therefore, the former Shaw
customers became bound by the defendant’s amending provision once they became customers of the defendant pursuant to the swap and continued to use the defendant’s
service. 23

The result of this decision is somewhat controversial
in that it places a relatively high burden upon a consumer to seek out and review the amended terms of an
online contract. It is not clear whether a Quebec court
would come to a similar conclusion on the facts, since, in
general, the Quebec consumer protection regime is considered to be particularly consumer friendly in comparison to its common law counterparts. In addition, the
Kanitz decision is perhaps the first Canadian decision to
uphold the enforceability of a notice and ‘‘webwrap’’
agreement (i.e., where the agreement is available online
via hyperlink and users are deemed to have seen and
consented to the agreement terms) as opposed to a
‘‘clickwrap’’ agreement (wherein the user must actively
demonstrate acceptance of posted terms by means of a
positive gesture such as clicking on an ‘‘I agree’’ icon). 24

North American Systemshops Ltd.
Although North American Systemshops Ltd. v.
King 25 is not an online contract formation case, it was
cited with approval in Paysystems and the legal notion of
‘‘shrinkwrap’’ software licenses informed the development of judicial reasoning in relation to ‘‘clickwrap’’ and
‘‘webwrap’’ licenses. At issue in the Systemshop case was
the enforceability of a software license, the terms of
which were printed on the inside back cover of a user’s
manual sold with the software. The plaintiffs in the case
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argued that the prominent presence of a copyright
symbol on the package of the software placed a burden
on the defendant to search for the license terms that
governed its use. The defendant argued that the sale of
the software without any apparent restrictions on use
resulted in an implied license to use the software as the
defendant saw fit. The Court sided with the defendant
holding that the plaintiff had an implied license to use
the purchased software, absent any conspicuous binding
notice of constraints on use.
It is important to note, however, that in Systemshops, the Court was careful to distinguish the facts in
the case from the more typical practice of exposing the
‘‘shrinkwrap’’ license terms directly under the cellophane
wrap used to package the licensed software. In fact,
American courts have upheld shrinkwrap agreements in
a number of cases. 26 Their enforceability has been premised on there being an act by the proposed licensee,
namely removing the cellophane, manifesting assent to
the terms of the shrinkwrap license, or indicating an
understanding that a contract is being formed as a result
of action taken by the user.
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U.S. Common Law Online Contracting Decisions

Ticketmaster
A California District Court underscored the
common-law principles that will govern contractual
enforcement of Web site terms and conditions in the
case of Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc. 27 Ticketmaster claimed, among other things, that rival
Tickets.com’s practice of deep linking; that is, linking
directly to Web pages within Ticketmaster’s Web site,
violated the terms and conditions of Ticketmaster’s Web
site. The judge granted Tickets.com’s motion to dismiss
the breach of contract claim. Key to the judge’s decision
to dismiss the breach of contract claim appeared to be
the lack of conspicuousness of the terms and conditions
at issue. The judge noted:
The home page contains (if a customer scrolls to the
bottom) ‘‘Terms and Conditions’’ which proscribe, among
other things, copying for commercial use. However, the customer need not view the Terms and Conditions to proceed
straight to the event page which interests him. 28

The judge in Ticketmaster distinguished the lack of
conspicuousness of the notice and the lack of a requirement of consent in this case from shrinkwrap cases,
noting:
In defending this claim, Ticketmaster makes reference to
the ‘‘shrinkwrap license’’ cases, where the packing on the
outside of the CD stated that opening the package constitutes adherence to the license agreement (restricting republication) contained therein. This has been held to be
enforceable. That is not the same as this case because the
‘‘shrink-wrap license agreement’’ is open and obvious and in
fact hard to miss. Many websites make you click on ‘‘agree’’
to the Terms and Conditions before going on, but Ticketmaster does not. Further, the Terms and Conditions are
set forth so that the customer needs to scroll down the
home page to find and read them. Many customers instead

Canadian Journal of Law and Technology

are likely to proceed to the event page of interest rather than
reading the ‘‘small print.’’ It cannot be said that merely
putting the Terms and Conditions in this fashion necessarily creates a contract with anyone using the website. 29

Netscape
A 2001 decision of a New York court emphasized
essentially the same principles. In Specht v. Netscape
Communications Corp. 30 Netscape attempted to enforce
an arbitration clause in an end user license agreement.
The license agreement was allegedly made by Netscape
and agreed to by users by downloading computer
software known as ‘‘SmartDownload’’ from Netscape’s
Web site. By clicking on a box, visitors initiated the
downloads. The sole reference to the license agreement
appeared in text that was visible only if a visitor scrolled
down through the page to the next screen. If the visitor
did so, he or she saw an invitation to review the license
agreement. 31 Visitors were not required affirmatively to
indicate their assent to the license agreement, or even to
view the license agreement, before proceeding with a
download of the software.
The New York court refused to enforce the
SmartDownload License Agreement. The Court distinguished this form of agreement from both clickwrap and
shrinkwrap licenses, which require users to perform an
affirmative action unambiguously expressing assent to a
contract. Netscape’s SmartDownload, in contrast,
allowed a user to download and use the software
without taking any action that plainly manifested assent
to the terms of the associated license or indicating an
understanding that a contract was being formed. Accordingly, the Court refused to find Netscape’s license
enforceable. The Court stated the following:
Netscape argues that the mere act of downloading indicates
assent. However, downloading is hardly an unambiguous
indication of assent. The primary purpose of downloading is
to obtain a product, not to assent to an agreement. In contrast, clicking on an icon stating ‘‘I assent’’ has no meaning
or purpose other than to indicate such assent. Netscape’s
failure to require users of SmartDownload to indicate assent
to its license as a precondition to downloading and using its
software is fatal to its argument that a contract has been
formed . . .
The case law on software licensing has not eroded the
importance of assent in contract formation. Mutual assent is
the bedrock of any agreement to which the law will give
force. Defendants’ position, if accepted, would so expand the
definition of assent as to render it meaningless. Because the
user Plaintiffs did not assent to the license agreement, they
are not subject to the arbitration clause contained therein
and cannot be compelled to arbitrate their claims against
the Defendants. 32

Register.com v. Verio, Inc.
In 2004, in Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 33 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
confirmed the District Court ruling in the same
matter, 34 providing further insight into the American
common-law position on online contract formation.
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A registrar of Internet domain names, Register.com,
operated an independent and interactive online
database, called the ‘‘WHOIS’’ database containing the
names and personal contact information of the plaintiff’s
customers. Through the use of an automated software
program, or ‘‘robot’’, the defendant harvested information from this database, using the information to advertise its own competing services to users who had recently
registered Internet domain names with Register.com.

Significantly, however, the decision in Register.com
challenged the decision of the Central District of California Court in Ticketmaster to the effect that one must
actively click a separate ‘‘I agree’’ button in order to be
bound by the terms of the agreement.
The Court of Appeal held as follows:
We recognize that contract offers on the Internet often
require the offeree to click on an ‘‘I agree’’ icon. And no
doubt, in many circumstances, such a statement of agreement by the offeree is essential to the formation of the
contract. But not in all circumstances. While new commerce
on the Internet has exposed courts to many new situations,
it has not fundamentally changed the principles of contract.
It is standard contract doctrine that when a benefit is offered
subject to stated conditions, and the offeree makes a decision to take a benefit with knowledge of the terms of the
offer, the taking constitutes an acceptance of the terms,
which accordingly becomes binding on the offeree.

Certain terms and conditions governing the use of
Register.com’s WHOIS database at the time of the
impugned activities by Verio were printed on each
search result of the WHOIS database. They read as follows:
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Username: zulika

Date: 22-AUG-06

Time: 10:32

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\04_02\morgan.dat

Seq: 7

By submitting a WHOIS query, you agree that you will use
this data only for lawful purposes and that, under no circumstances will you use this data to: (1) allow,
enable, or otherwise support the transmission of
mass unsolicited, commercial advertising or solicitations via direct mail, electronic mail, or by telephone; or (2) enable high volume, automated, electronic
processes that apply to Register.com (or its systems). The
compilation, repackaging, dissemination or other use of this
data is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Register.com. Register.com reserves the right to
modify these terms at any time. By submitting this
query, you agree to abide by these terms. [Emphasis
added]

In short, the Court held that even in the absence of
a ‘‘click’’, an online contract may be held to be enforceable if there is sufficient evidence that the Web site user
was made aware of terms governing the use of the Web
site and the user continued to use the Web site thereafter.

It must be emphasized, however, that these terms
and conditions were only displayed to the user following
the submission of the WHOIS query.

Although these cases are American, the reasoning in
these cases would likely be applied in Canada (particularly in the common-law provinces). As illustrated in the
cases, the issues likely to be dispositive in upholding the
validity of an online contract are whether the Web site
user has knowledge of the conditions and has given
express or implied consent to them.

At trial, the District Court held, among other things,
that Verio had assented to the above terms of use, even
though it was not required to click an ‘‘I Agree’’ icon. On
appeal the Court of Appeal agreed.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The decision of the Court of Appeal is based on
three key factors: (i) the terms of use were published in
full on the search results (rather than being made available via hyperlink); (ii) Verio engaged in persistent data
mining, returning to the Web site repeatedly to collect
more information (hence, while Verio may have successfully argued after a single visit that it was unaware of
and/or had not assented to the terms of use, Verio could
not continue to argue this point following multiple
access); and (iii) Verio actually admitted that it was aware
of the terms of use. In effect, the fact that Verio came to
know of the terms and conditions during its frequent
visits to the site (and hence, knowingly acted in violation
of contractual terms that governed the use of the Web
site) resulted in a contract breach. The Court reasoned
that the situation of the defendant in this case was not
analogous to the one-time users in Specht who were
oblivious to the presence of terms posted at the bottom
of a Web page. Indeed, Verio admitted that its daily
access to the WHOIS database supplied them with full
awareness of the terms according to which Register.com
offered a right of entry. The reasoning in Specht was thus
maintained, but distinguished on the facts.

I

n the Paysystems decision, the Court held that Paysystems’s approach to online contract formation was
unenforceable. Ultimately, this conclusion is defensible
under Quebec law insofar as Paysystem’s approach to
contract formation did not provide a means of determining whether or not the other party was actually
aware of the amended contractual terms posted on
Paysystems’s Web site or an unequivocal means of determining whether those terms had been accepted. However, in the Paysystems decision, the Court appears to
assert further that (i) tacit acceptance of an electronic
offer may never be binding; (ii) something more than a
‘‘mere’’ click is likely required to form a binding online
contract; and (iii) a signature may be necessary to establish binding consent to the online contract. It is submitted that none of these latter assertions is accurate.
Case law on point from the United States and applicable case law from Canada (including Quebec) suggests
that whether terms and conditions will be binding will
depend on the method used to obtain the consent of
Web site users. Applying the principles that have been
applied in shrinkwrap license and webwrap cases, it
appears likely that Web site terms and conditions will be
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enforced where (i) the terms and conditions are conspicuous and likely to be read by, or knowledge of them
may be reasonably imputed to, visitors at the time of
their initial visit; and (ii) consent with the terms and
conditions may be reasonably implied.
On the basis of the above analysis, it is possible to
distinguish six different approaches to obtaining online
contract formation, as follows:
1. The ‘‘click plus’’ approach. The user is presented
with contractual terms and must scroll through, click an
‘‘I agree’’ icon and do ‘‘something more’’ (such as typing
in a password, initials, OR clicking on a separate toggle
button) prior to accessing the online product or service.
For example:

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\04_02\morgan.dat

Seq: 8

5. The ‘‘notice + passive hyperlink’’ approach. The
user is presented an unambiguous, conspicuous notice to
the effect that in subsequently using the Web site the
user will be deemed to have accepted the terms of an
agreement that is made available by means of hyperlinked text contained in the notice. The user is not
required to click on the hyperlink nor perform any other
positive gesture prior to accessing the online product or
service. For example:
2. The ‘‘clickwrap’’ approach. The user is presented
with the contractual terms and must scroll through and
click an ‘‘I agree’’ icon onscreen prior to accessing the
online product or service. For example:

Time: 10:32
Date: 22-AUG-06
Username: zulika

✄ REMOVE

4. The ‘‘notice + click’’ approach. The user is
presented an unambiguous notice to the effect that by
performing a positive gesture (such as clicking an icon)
the user will be deemed to have accepted the terms of
the agreement that is made available by means of a
hyperlinked text contained in the notice. The user must
perform the positive gesture prior to accessing the online
product or service. For example:

By using this Web site, you will be deemed to have accepted
the terms and conditions of the Legal Agreement [underlined text hyperlinked to agreement].

6. The ‘‘webwrap’’ approach. The user is presented
with a hyperlink that leads the user to contractual terms
posted on the Web site. The user is not required to click
on the hyperlink nor perform any other positive gesture
prior to accessing the online product or service. The
following hyperlink is placed on the Web page (often at
the bottom of the page). For example:
Legal Agreement [underlined text hyperlinked to agreement].

3. The ‘‘notice + dual conf irmation’’ approach.
The user is presented with an unambiguous notice to
the effect that by performing a positive gesture (such as
clicking an icon) the user will be deemed to have
accepted the terms of the agreement that is made available by means of a hyperlinked text contained in the
notice. The user must perform a dual confirmation gesture prior to accessing the online product or service
(such as clicking a toggle button, then clicking an ‘‘I
agree’’ icon). 35 For example:

The risk that a court will hold that an approach to
online contract formation is unenforceable will increase
as one moves from the ‘‘click plus’’ approach to the
‘‘webwrap’’ approach. 36 Based on the analysis above, the
first four approaches should form a binding contract in
Canadian common and civil law (assuming no other
statutory formalities apply to the contract). The fifth
approach may create a binding contract in common-law
jurisdictions, but likely will not create a binding contract
under Quebec civil law. The pure webwrap approach
will almost never create a binding contract (unless there
is other circumstantial evidence that demonstrates
knowledge of and consent to the posted terms).
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